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ABSTRACT
The study of the impacts of new mining projects in Africa is generally set in
a normative debate about their possible contribution to development, which
leads to a representation of African societies as divided between beneficia-
ries and victims of foreign investments. Based on research in the Congolese
copperbelt, this article aims to examine in more detail the inequalities gen-
erated by the recent mining boom by taking the processes of labour market
segmentation as a starting point. It shows that the labour market in the mining
sector has progressively been organized along three intersecting lines that
divide it: the first is between employment in industrial and artisanal mining
companies, the second is between jobs for mining or subcontracting compa-
nies and the third is between jobs for expatriates, Congolese skilled workers
and local unskilled workers. Far from simply reflecting existing social in-
equalities, the labour market has been actively involved in their creation, and
its control has caused growing tensions in the Congolese copperbelt region.
Although largely neglected in the literature on extractive industries, pro-
cesses of labour market segmentation are key to making sense of the impacts
of mining investments on the shape of societies in the global South.
INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades, African countries endowed with mineral re-
sources have witnessed an unprecedented rise in foreign direct investments
in the mining sector, primarily from Europe and North America but also,
for a rapidly growing share, from China. It is well-documented that this
boomwas largely the result of the liberalization of the African mining sector
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that has been promoted by the World Bank as a new development strategy
since the 1990s. Following this liberalization process, hundreds of compan-
ies flocked to resource-rich countries to obtain mining rights and to start new
projects.
The implementation of these neoliberal reforms has spawned a large
amount of literature which has challenged the World Bank’s assumptions
about the contribution of mining to development (for an overview, see
Bebbington et al., 2008; Pegg, 2006). On the basis of aggregate figures,
proponents of the resource-curse thesis have argued that the abundance of
natural resources in poor countries does not generally bring expected bene-
fits; on the contrary, it is correlated with poor development indicators and
the occurrence of armed conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Ross, 1999;
Rosser, 2005; Sachs and Warner, 1995). At the local level, a multitude
of reports by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have documented
the weak and/or negative impacts of industrial mining projects in terms of
poverty alleviation. In the academic literature on Africa, the critique has, to
a large extent, focused on the marginalization of artisanal miners, and on
howmining companies deal with them (see, e.g., Carstens and Hilson, 2009;
Geenen andVerweijen, 2017; Hilson, 2002, 2009; Hilson andHaselip, 2005;
Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007).
The conclusion of most of these studies is that mining reforms have only
benefited the few, leaving the local population behind: the rise of foreign
investments in the industrial mining sector has led to growing inequalities
between a minority of ‘winners’ (for example company shareholders, pol-
itical authorities, local elites, etc.), and a majority of ‘losers’ (including
artisanal miners and local communities and individuals). In this respect, the
literature echoes those scholars who see behind neoliberal reforms a project
of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2003: 137–82) which generates
a growing ‘relative surplus population’— a population deprived of its means
of subsistence and, at the same time, of no use to capital (Li, 2009, 2011,
2017; Sassen, 2010).While this line of analysis is probably correct in general
(a minority receives a disproportionate share of the benefits), it remains far
too simple. This article aims to study the inequalities generated by themining
boom in more detail by taking the ‘segmentation’ of the labour market in
the copper mining sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a
point of departure.1
The study of labour market segmentation was originally developed by
Doeringer and Piore (1971) to account for the persistence of racial and social
inequalities among American workers in the 1960s. For these authors, such
inequalities were the result not only of people’s career strategies, but also of
the organization of the labour market. Far from constituting a homogeneous
1. This industry is located in what is known as the Congolese copperbelt region, which
corresponds to the new provinces of Haut-Katanga and Lualaba (the southern part of the
former Katanga province) along the border with Zambia.
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space responding to the law of supply and demand, the labour market is
viewed as being divided into two segments with different recruitment pro-
cedures, different wages, different working conditions, and different career
opportunities: a primary segment, corresponding to the ‘internal market’ of
large firms, and a secondary segment, that is associated with the low-paid,
precarious jobs that are offered by small firms. As poor (black) workers are
largely excluded from ‘good’ jobs in the primary segment, this dual organ-
ization of the labour market contributes to the creation of racial and social
inequalities. Since this seminal work, labour segmentation theory has been
developed in political economy, sociology and geography, to better take into
account:
1) The multiple ways in which the labour market can be segmented: these
are no longer represented as founded on a simple primary/secondary
opposition depending on the size of firms (Jones, 1983; Michon,
1987);
2) The various factors involved in segmentation independently of tech-
nical and economic constraints: employers’ control strategies, state
regulations, the role of trade unions and other pressure groups, and so
on (Gordon et al., 1982; Kalleberg and Sorensen, 1979; Kenny and
Webster, 1998);
3) The spatial dimension of labour markets, and their embeddedness in
various forms of social life (Peck, 1996).
This body of literature provides a possible approach to account empirically
for the persistent salience of race, gender, class and other forms of division
(religion, ethnicity, etc.) in the organization of global capitalism’s relations
of production (Brodkin, 2000; see also Tsing, 2009).2
After a brief description of the organization of the labour market before
the liberalization of the mining sector in the early 2000s, I will attempt to
outline the ‘organizational segmentation’ — that is, the working conditions
found in different types of companies — of the labour market that followed
the establishment of foreign mining investors in the copperbelt region. I will
then discuss in more detail the recruitment practices of mining companies
according to the type of job — what might be called ‘the occupational
segmentation’ of the labour market. Finally, I will detail a case study on one
specific company to bring to light the tensions resulting from inequalities in
the labour market and their spatial embeddedness. Generally speaking, the
article will focus on the forms of segmentation of the labourmarket, and their
2. With the exception of sociologists affiliated to the Society, Work, and Development Insti-
tute (SWOP) at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa (Bezuidenhout and
Buhlungu, 2011; Forrest, 2015; Kenny and Webster, 1998), few researchers have taken the
labour market as an entry point from which to study recent changes in the mining sector in
Africa.
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outcome in terms of economic and social inequalities. For reasons of space,
the various factors involved in these processes (the mode of production,
control strategies, state regulations, the role of unions, etc.) will be left in the
background. They will be the subject of another article on the micro-politics
of work in the mining sector.
The Congolese copperbelt provides a particularly interesting case through
which to study inequalities in the labour market in the context of the mining
boom. For more than a century, living in the urban centres of this region
has been closely associated with the opportunity to work and, even today,
access to employment is one of the most pressing claims that people make
from mining companies. Moreover, over the last 20 years, the copperbelt
has attracted investors of various sizes and origins who have contributed
to the development of both industrial and artisanal mining. Understanding
the changes that they have made in the domain of labour implies, therefore,
moving beyond the tendency in the literature on extractive industries to
focus on one project, or on investors from one country, in order to study the
dynamics of the labour market more broadly.
The Congolese mining sector nevertheless poses serious challenges to re-
searchers. The only available figures on employment in the mining sector are
those provided by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI):
Appendix 6 of the organization’s 2014 and 2015 reports give an indication
of the number of direct and indirect jobs created by mining companies for
expatriate and national workers.3 It is almost impossible for researchers to
complement or update these figures given the large number of companies
involved, the difficulty of accessing those established in rural areas and
the reluctance of employers to disclose information. The analysis below is
principally based on research carried out between 2016 and 2018 within
the framework of the WORKinMINING project — a comparative research
project on labour in Zambia and DRC funded by the European Research
Council. Over the course of several fieldtrips, I undertook approximately
100 interviews with the human resources (HR) managers of more than 20
mining companies, as well as trade unionists, workers, subcontractors, pol-
itical figures, labour inspectors and customary chiefs — all those involved
in the regulation of the labour market broadly speaking. The resulting data
are very uneven: they are detailed for some companies, but much less so for
others. However, complemented by past research, advocacy organizations’
reports, and data collected by other project team members in the DRC, the
fieldwork provides — I believe — a comprehensive view of the dynamics
of the labour market in the mining sector as a whole.
3. See: https://eiti.org/document/2014-democratic-republic-of-congo-eiti-report and https://
eiti.org/document/republic-of-congo-2015-eiti-report. As the data in these EITI reports are
based on the self-reporting of mining companies, these figures must be taken with some
caution. In addition, data are missing for several companies.
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AN INTERNAL LABOUR MARKET
For many years the mining sector in the Congolese copperbelt region was
dominated by the state-owned companies Union Minie`re du Haut-Katanga
(UMHK), from 1906 to 1967, and Ge´ne´rale des Carrie`res et des Mines
(Ge´camines), from 1967 to 2003. In the early colonial period, UMHK de-
pended on contractors who recruited migrant workers from afar. In the
1920s, in order to overcome the shortage of labour, UMHK implemented a
‘stabilization’ programme that consisted of organizing its own recruitment
missions in rural areas and modernizing its camps to allow workers to come
and live there with their wives and children (Dibwe dia Mwembu, 2001;
Fetter, 1973; Higginson, 1989; Perrings, 1979). Workers recruited through
these missions — with a significant contingent coming from the Kasaı¨
province — came to form the core of its workforce: the company took
charge of every aspect of their lives, and established an internal labour
market that prioritized them, their male children and their parents. This pol-
icy was continued after the DRC gained independence in 1960. Although
Ge´camines put in place a more open recruitment procedure (Henk, 1988),
a large number of job candidates came from the company’s schools and
families, so it did not deter the social reproduction of the workforce.
Following the collapse of Ge´camines’s Kamoto underground mine in
1990, the company’s production decreased abruptly. This decline in produc-
tionwas not immediately followed by staff cuts, although the political mobil-
ization to expel the ‘Kasaı¨ens’ from Katanga province in 1992–93 resulted
in the departure of approximatively 9,000 workers (from a total of 34,000)
from the company (see Dibwe dia Mwembu, 2001). On the other hand, con-
fronted by hyperinflation, wage arrears and disruptions in the distribution of
food rations, Ge´camines’s workers experienced a rapid deterioration in their
living conditions. Plunged into extreme poverty, they had no choice but to
develop informal activities in subsistence agriculture, petty trade, or poultry
farming with their wives and children (Rubbers, 2013).
To address this situation, theWorldBank pushed the state-owned company
to transfer some of its mining and industrial assets to joint-venture projects
with foreign investors. Although the first partnership contracts were signed
in the second half of the 1990s, most were concluded after the adoption of the
new mining code in 2002, which provided particularly attractive conditions
for investors. In some cases, Ge´camines employees were also transferred
to joint-venture projects through an employer substitution procedure. To
allow Ge´camines to continue its own operations on a smaller scale, the
World Bank put in place a restructuring plan that involved reducing the
company’s personnel from 24,000 to 14,000 workers. This reduction in staff
was organized within the framework of a controversial ‘voluntary departure
programme’ in 2003–04 (Rubbers, 2010, 2017).
The recovery plan has not met its objectives so far. In 2015, independently
of the joint-venture projects in which it is involved, Ge´camines produced
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only 18,000 tons of copper — 2 per cent of the total production (1 million
tons) in DRC and 4 per cent of its record production level (486,000 tons in
1986). However, with 8,600 workers, it remained the largest employer in the
copperbelt’s mining sector, which employed a total of 40,000. Compared to
those in newmining projects, theseworkers have enjoyed greater job security
(there were no redundancies at Ge´camines following the fall in copper prices
in 2008–09 and 2011–15) and a larger range of benefits, including free access
to schools for their children. On the other hand, their wages are much lower
than those paid in the large private mining companies and they had, until
recently, suffered several months of wage arrears. This is why those who
are offered the opportunity do not hesitate to leave Ge´camines for the new
joint-venture projects.
ORGANIZATIONAL SEGMENTATION
Since the late 1990s, the mining sector in the Congolese copperbelt has
undergone a dual process of liberalization: from above, with the creation
of new industrial mining projects, and from below, with the development
of artisanal mining. On the one hand, as mentioned in the previous section,
Ge´camines was forced by the World Bank to make several of its mines
available for foreign investors. Under the mining code, these mines had
to be sold, but due to political interference, the majority of new mining
projects have been set up as joint ventures with the state-owned company
as a minority partner (Carter Center, 2017). The latter is currently bound
by 30 partnership contracts, and only two leasing contracts. From this total
of 32 projects, 14 are currently in the production phase. These involve
various types of investors: Western majors and juniors, Chinese state-owned
companies, and smaller private firms of various origins. On the other hand,
in 1998, Laurent-De´sire´ Kabila’s government asked Ge´camines to make
some quarries available for artisanal mining. Within a few months, tens
of thousands of artisanal miners had entered a number of the company’s
quarries, a marketing chain for heterogenite (cobalt-rich ore) was put in
place, and the plants (both smelters and hydrometallurgical plants) to process
this orewere built (seeRubbers, 2013). The first plantswere created byGreek
and Indian businessmen who were already established in DRC. In the mid-
2000s, they were followed by Chinese migrant entrepreneurs, who started
building up to 30 small processing units in various parts of the copperbelt.4
Following the financial crisis in 2008, most of these enterprises closed down
(Cuvelier, 2009; Jansson, 2012). Since then, fewer than a dozen enterprises
4. According to Jansson (2012: 182–83), the influx of these entrepreneurswas of the ‘gold-rush’
type, which means that they were attracted by profit opportunities in the mining sector. For
similar observations in Ghana and Cameroon, see Crawford and Botchwey (2017); Hilson
et al. (2014); Nguepjouo (2017); Weng et al. (2015).
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have resumed their operations. While the smallest among them continue to
exclusively buy heterogenite from dealers, traders and artisanal miners, the
largest — medium-sized enterprises that are owned by Indian and Chinese
businessmen — have also managed to obtain rights over mines that they
develop industrially (with machines) or semi-industrially (with machines
and artisanal miners).
While artisanal mining provides a means of subsistence for a large number
of people in the copperbelt region, the reform of the mining sector designed
by the World Bank has done nothing to support this sector. Since the early
2000s, most of the mines in which these people were working have been
transferred to foreign companies, which have taken strong measures to expel
the miners from their new property. These forced evictions have led to a
number of conflicts over the past 15 years, as a large number of artisanal
miners have continued to enter the mining concessions illegally. While
the mining code provides for the creation of ‘artisanal mining zones’, the
government has been reluctant to delineate them on the map. It was only in
2014 that 78 of these zones were created in the copperbelt. By the Director
of the mining cadastre administration’s own admission,5 most are actually
inadequate for artisanal mining. Unless they encroach illegally on industrial
mining concessions, artisanal miners are thus increasingly left with a choice
between moving to small mining sites far from urban centres, or working
for semi-industrial companies as day labourers.
In view of this dual process of liberalization, the labour market in the
mining sector can be divided into two broad segments corresponding to the
distinction between industrial and artisanal companies. Industrial mining
companies offer permanent jobs, high wages and good working conditions.
Progressively, they have established a bureaucratic organization of work,
including industrial relations, which complywith Congolese law. In artisanal
mining companies, by contrast, most workers are recruited as unskilled day
labourers and earn very low wages. Their organization of work, which is
more dependent on personal relationships with management, is to varying
degrees characterized by unfair dismissals, poor health and safety conditions,
and lack of union representation. Such violations of the law are hidden by
management who buy the silence of labour inspectors.
Following Doeringer and Piore’s thesis (1971), the distinctive labour pol-
icies of industrial and artisanal mining companies are best understood in the
light of their differences in size, the importance of their capital, their techno-
logical development, their level of production, their number of employees,
etc. From this perspective, the widely held opinion that Asian companies
offer inferior conditions of employment compared with those offered by
Western companies is correct only insofar as most of them are small min-
ing companies processing ore from artisanal mining. Several human rights
5. Interview, General Director of the Mining Cadastre, Kinshasa, 9 June 2017.
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organizations (such as Action Against Impunity for Human Rights, Premi
Congo, etc.) have published reports denouncing the working conditions in
these small enterprises. It is, however, important to add that conditions of
employment in the small companies created by Greek businessmen in the
early 2000s were not much better.
For industrial mining companies, the situation is more complex, as sev-
eral mining projects have been developed by Western companies and then
bought out by Chinese enterprises. Since these enterprises have kept the
existing management structures in place, they offer analogous conditions of
employment to those of Western mining projects. In this article, therefore,
following local usage, these companies with capital from China and man-
agers from North America, South Africa or Australia are included in the
category of Western companies. It is true that companies with capital and
management from China — such as the Sino-Congolaise des Mines project
(SCM)6 — mostly hire unskilled workers, and offer them lower wages than
theWestern mining companies. However, these projects only began produc-
tion in the 2010s, when copper prices were low. Unlike Western investors,
SCMwas not able to take advantage of the commodity super-cycle. Whether
in artisanal or industrial mining projects, poorer conditions of employment
in Chinese companies can be explained by factors other than the nationality
or culture of capital (Hairong and Sautman, 2013; Mohan, 2013). In addi-
tion, the contrast between Asian and Western companies underestimates the
capacity of smaller Asian enterprises to improve their employment practices
(Lee, 2017). The history of the company Chemicals of Africa (CHEMAF),
owned by an Indian businessman, is a case in point:
This enterprise started in 2002 with a hydrometallurgical plant that processed ore bought
from artisanal miners, before it obtained rights over several mines. For a long time, the bulk
of the workforce was composed of day labourers who worked under the control of Indian and
Congolese supervisors. The management of the company was marked by the arbitrary power
of its owner, and the struggles of the small informal networks that evolved in his entourage.
Confronted with threats of strike action and the payment of high penalties to the labour
inspectorate, however, efforts have been made in recent years to improve working conditions
and formalize the management of human resources: the number of permanent employees
has been increased, and their salaries augmented; the employment of day labourers has been
outsourced to a subcontractor; and various rules and procedures have been adopted. In 2015,
CHEMAF reported employing 1,104 direct workers, including 152 expatriates, and 689
indirect workers to the ITIE. According to the HRmanager, Congolese (direct) workers earn,
on average, one third less than those working for Western mining companies, but receive
equivalent benefits.7
The growing use of outsourcing among mining companies has introduced
another form of duality in the labour market that cross-cuts the distinction
6. The SCM project is the result of a resource-for-infrastructure deal in 2009 between the
Congolese government and a consortium of Chinese central state owned companies (see
Jansson, 2013; Landry, 2018).
7. Based on interviews, CHEMAF manager, Lubumbashi, 9 and 13 November 2016, and 29
July 2017.
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between the labour markets created by artisanal and industrial mining com-
panies. Independently of the market for direct jobs (in mining companies), a
large market for indirect jobs (in subcontracting companies) has developed
since the beginning of the mining boom. Outsourcing is general practice
for all mining projects in the 21st century, from exploration to production.
Since it is one of the principal methods by which mining companies cut
costs, however, the downturn in copper prices in 2008, and again in 2011,
gave it a new impetus. In several projects, those tasks that were previously
performed by employees (cleaning, catering, training, etc.) have been out-
sourced over the past decade. In contrast to the situation in Zambia (Hairong
and Sautman, 2013; Lee, 2017), Chinese enterprises are no exception to this
trend in DRC.
As subcontracting includes various types of actors (multinational compa-
nies, middle-sized foreign firms, Congolese businessmen, etc.) in different
sectors, it is impossible to provide a general picture of the market for indirect
jobs. However, three broad differences to the direct labour market can be
identified: (1) it involves a much larger proportion of unskilled temporary
jobs (the type of work that mining companies outsource in the first place);
(2) whatever the level of skills, jobs on this market are more precarious (they
depend on contracts with mining companies); and (3) salaries are generally
inferior, although this is not always the case; in multinational companies
and some middle-sized enterprises, they are comparable to those paid by
large mining companies. In the same way, casual workers in small Chinese
enterprises receive more or less the same wage as the permanent unskilled
workers (between US$ 100 and US$ 200; see below).
Although artisanal mining is to a large extent a subsistence activity, it is
certainly not disconnected from the circuits of capitalism. On the contrary,
it is an integral part of the global cobalt supply chain. Accordingly, artisanal
miners, traders and dealers can also be seen as subcontractors of the mining
industry. Artisanal mining is the principal source of supply of small plants
processing heterogenite. It is also themode of production that some small and
medium-sized enterprises have chosen in order to develop their mines: they
work with a cooperative of artisanal miners, or hire them as day labourers
through a labour broker. Finally, some industrial mining companies buy
copper and cobalt oxides from traders to upgrade and/or complement their
plant’s supply. Generally speaking, artisanal miners can be viewed as part
of a large labour submarket — a market subordinated to the global mining
industry, but organized independently, and characterized by poor working
conditions (long working hours, poor health and safety conditions, irregular
earnings, etc.). In total, this submarket produces more than 20 per cent of
DRC’s cobalt.
In 2016, Amnesty International and African Resources Watch started a
media campaign that attracted public attention to this subcontracting re-
lationship. Their report warned of human rights abuses, including child
labour, that were linked to cobalt production in the artisanal mines of the
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copperbelt (Amnesty International, 2016). In response, the Chinese Cham-
ber of Commerce for Metals, Minerals and Chemicals Importers and Ex-
porters, which counts major car manufacturers and electronics companies
among its members, immediately launched the Responsible Cobalt Initia-
tive, which aims at establishing a cobalt supply-chain management system
in accordance with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment due diligence guidelines. A cobalt traceability pilot project using
blockchain technology is under way at the time of writing this article. It is
too early to assess the results of this initiative, but if it is implemented effec-
tively, it is likely to have the same negative effects as the various initiatives
established to control the 3Ts (tin, tungsten and tantalum) supply chains
in Eastern Congo: it will contribute to the further marginalization of arti-
sanal miners for the benefit of mining companies and the state (see Diemel,
2018; Diemel and Cuvelier, 2015; Seay, 2012; Vogel and Raeymaekers,
2016).
According to the most recent EITI report, in 2015 there were 50 mining
companies in the copperbelt region.8 Together, they (including Ge´camines)
created 40,000 direct jobs and at least 22,000 indirect jobs.9 There are no
reliable figures for the number of artisanal miners, which varies according
to seasons and cobalt prices. One of the most serious studies on this issue
(Tsurukawa et al., 2011) suggests that between 67,000 and 79,000 people
were employed in artisanal mining in 2011 (74 per cent as miners and others
as washers, porters, etc.). Although this number has probably declined since
then, artisanal mining is still firmly established in the copperbelt (see Faber
et al., 2017).
OCCUPATIONAL SEGMENTATION
The representation of the labour market as divided into two broad segments
according to the size or type of firms (organizational segmentation) fails
to take into account variations in job quality within firms (occupational
segmentation). In the case of mining investments in the global South, one
must pay particular attention to the differences in recruitment practices for
expatriate executives and technicians, national skilled workers and local
unskilled workers. These recruitment channels correspond to significant
disparities in terms of hierarchical position, job security and the level of
remuneration. This three-level structure is transversal to all companies, even
though the number of workers in each segment varies according to the
company’s size and origins.
8. See https://eiti.org/document/republic-of-congo-2015-eiti-report
9. Since figures about indirect jobs are missing for many companies, their total number is
certainly underestimated.
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Expatriates
Throughout the 20th century, the labour market for white workers remained
separate from that for black workers. In the early days, most expatriates
were recruited in the United Kingdom, or from among migrants from South-
ern Africa. After control of UMHK passed into Belgian hands in the late
1910s, however, Anglophone workers were progressively replaced with
young graduates from the metropole (Fetter, 1973; UMHK, 1956: Ch. 2).
The number of Belgian employees grew with the development of UMHK’s
operations after World War II. It was only after the company was nation-
alized, and a programme to Africanize management personnel was put in
place, that this number gradually dropped from about 2,000 in the 1960s to
500 in the late 1980s. The liberalization of the mining sector and the boom
of foreign investments in the early 2000s, however, contributed to a revival
in the market for expatriate workers in DRC.
Expatriates are usually recruited as executives or technicians by the joint-
venture majority partner’s main or regional office in the country in which
it is established. In global mining companies, a certain number can also
be transferred from other projects around the world, or recruited from the
international market through specialized sites or agencies. In DRC, this is a
market to which the mining project’s HR manager (a position reserved for
nationals) does not have access, as one manager explained:
The law provides that the company can only hire an expatriate if no Congolese candidate
for the position can be found, but the way we recruit here, expatriates fall like rain [i.e. in
a sudden and unpredictable way]. I often find new expatriates on site: ‘Hello, since when?’.
They are in positions that could have been occupied by Congolese people, but I can’t do
anything. I have not even been informed of the opening of the position.10
For a certain number of jobs, the choice to recruit an expatriate can
be justified by that person’s specific skills. Generally, however, the main
office abroad does not even inquire about the existence of workers with
the required skills on the Congolese market: they directly hire someone
from abroad. In addition, skills cannot account for the recruitment of all
expatriates: I met expatriates whose work as supervisors could have been
performed by nationals; some Congolese workers even told me that they had
to train the expatriate who later became their superior. The choice to hire
an expatriate instead of a Congolese is as much based on social and cultural
as on professional criteria: expatriate executives prefer to hire people with a
recognized degree, who speak their language, whom they feel they can trust
and, if possible, with whom they have already worked. These are the main
reasons given to justify the recruitment of expatriates, even though they cost
the company more than nationals.
10. Interview, HR manager, Lubumbashi, 14 April 2017.
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In Indian and Chinese companies, the cost of employing expatriates is
not a problem, as the monthly salary of Asian expatriates — which ranges
from US$ 1,000 to US$ 3,000 — is generally not much higher than that of
Congolese managers with similar qualifications. This is much lower than the
salaries of expatriates recruited on the international market, who earn from
US$ 6,000 to US$ 25,000 per month; in addition, they are offered regular
home leave, while Indian and Chinese workers must often wait for the end
of their contract to take holidays.
In most companies, expatriates sign two-year contracts, the duration of
which corresponds to the validity of their work permits in DRC. At the
end of this period, they are never sure that their contract will be renewed,
and it is not necessarily easy to find such a well-paying job elsewhere. In
addition, expatriates — who often sign contracts in their home country —
are easily dismissed. When copper prices declined in 2008–09, and then
again in 2011–16, cuts in the expatriate staff were made in most companies
before, or at the same time as, cuts in the number of national staff.
Few Congolese workers manage to access the positions occupied by ex-
patriates.11 To do so, ideally they must be fluent in English, have obtained
a university degree abroad, and/or introduce themselves through expatri-
ate personal networks — which is difficult to do when expatriates tend to
stick together. An increasing number of Congolese workers with several
years of work experience in the sector, however, are being recruited by head
hunters established abroad, or through a specialized website, to work for
mining projects in DRC. They are offered salaries that are higher than those
of their compatriots, but significantly lower than those of the majority of
expatriates — that is, between US$ 4,000 and US$ 10,000 per month.
Legally, the number of foreign workers cannot exceed 10 per cent of
the total workforce. However, this percentage is exceeded in many Asian
companies, which tend to put Indian or Chinese workers in all positions
involving responsibility. While SCM, for example, has signed a special
agreement with the Congolese state that allows it to do so, smaller artisanal
mining companies generally bribe low-level officials so that they turn a blind
eye to the number of expatriates. Although Western companies generally
comply with the law in this domain, the total number of expatriate workers
on site often exceeds 10 per cent if those working for service or consultancy
companies are taken into account. In some projects, the foreign staff is more
important in subcontracting than in the permanent workforce.
Congolese Skilled Workers
The recruitment process involving Congolese managers and skilled workers
differs between Western and Asian companies. In Western companies, it
11. In most companies, the highest position held by a Congolese is that of HR manager, a
position which is reserved for nationals by law.
Mining and Labour Market Segmentation in the DRC Copperbelt 13
is undertaken by the HR departments of the mining projects (not the for-
eign joint-venture partner’s office), which publicize job vacancies through
the National Employment Office and media outlets such as Okapi radio,
MediaCongo’s website, FaceBook, etc. In Asian companies, news of job va-
cancies circulates almost exclusively amongst workers via word of mouth.
In both types of company, however, most candidates for skilled jobs find
the information through personal networks — principally former colleagues
and friends from university — and come from the copperbelt’s largest cities
(Kahola, 2015). The labour market in the Congolese mining sector is not
very different from other labour markets in this respect (Granovetter, 1995).
In contrast to Chinese companies, Western companies have put in place a
formal selection procedure: candidates are first selected by the HR depart-
ment on the basis of their curriculum vitae (CV); those who have obtained
the best test results are then interviewed by a committee of HR and recruit-
ment professionals, who make the final choice. Amongst the skilled workers
I met, few were offered their job without at least passing an interview. Yet
this examination procedure causes widespread suspicions of influence ped-
dling, patronage and tribalism. After all, managers involved in the process
have plenty of room for manoeuvre to favour or exclude candidates: the HR
manager, who receives recommendations from all sides (family members,
customary chiefs, political authorities, etc.), has the opportunity to sort CVs;
at the end of the process, it is traditionally the head of the department inwhich
the candidate will work who has the final say. Finally, both managers can
see their influence nullified by instructions from the executives above them.
In all mining companies, Congolese skilled workers are offered permanent
contracts. However, this does not mean much in a context where companies
see labour as a cost variable to be adjusted to changes in copper prices.
According to Cuvelier (2009: 10–11), following the financial crisis of 2008,
several Chinese enterprises processing ore from artisanal mining left the
DRC, and their workers lost their jobs overnight. In the same period, and
then again between 2011 and 2015, most Western mining companies made
staff cuts through various procedures such as mass redundancy, voluntary
departure programmes or technical leave. However, this is not the case
with all mining projects. Despite the challenges confronting them, there
are mining companies of various sizes and origins that have not reduced
their workforce numbers. This is a decision that depends less on the type of
investor than on the constraints within which they are working: the project’s
development phase, production costs, the joint-venture majority partner’s
liabilities, etc. For now, the evolution of the labour market in DRC does
not really allow us to corroborate Lee’s thesis (2017) of a contrast between
the short-term perspective of private global capital and the more long-term
perspective of Chinese state capital.
At the same time, and especially during the boom years (2004–11), mobil-
ity of the skilled workers themselves between companies has increased. As
interviews show, they no longer hesitate to resign in order to seek a better job
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(with a higher salary and/or closer to their family) elsewhere. It must be said
that, unlike Ge´camines in the past, mining companies offer their workers
few opportunities for career advancement, even if they provide them with
access to training programmes abroad. So, to climb the ladder, workers must
apply for a job in another company. Since the downturn of copper prices in
2011, however, inter-firm mobility has slowed considerably (the personnel
turnover ratio is very low in all the companies for which I could obtain
figures). The workers I met told me that they tried to keep their jobs while
waiting for the mining sector to recover.
Linked to each other by various types of social network, the workers of
different mining companies constantly compare their conditions of employ-
ment. Although small in number and length, the strikes that have broken
out in the last decade have generally been caused by differences in salaries,
bonuses and benefits between companies. On a more regular basis, union
representatives readily use this type of comparison, and the risks of strikes
associated with them, to demand improvements from employers. Since the
beginning of the mining boom, this risk of strikes, coupled with inter-firm
competition for skilled and experienced workers, has led to a gradual upward
convergence of wages across the companies of the industrial sector. Today,
the net salary of semi-skilled workers is between US$ 200 and US$ 400
per month; supervisors earn between US$ 500 and US$ 800, and salaries of
lower-level managers range between US$ 1,000 and US$ 2,500. However,
as we have seen, there are still important wage disparities between Western
and Asian companies.
Driven for the most part by large industrial companies, the demand for
Congolese skilled workers increased sharply between 2006 and 2008, and
again between 2009 and 2011. Since then, it has remained low. In a context
of declining copper prices, most companies have cut their workforce and lim-
ited the hiring of new workers to a minimum (on average, between 5 and 10
per year).With the exception of SCM, no newmining project has started pro-
duction. In the past two years, copper and cobalt production has risen again,
and activities in the mining sector have slowly resumed. It remains to be seen
how this growth will translate into the labour market. The ups and downs of
the past decade have made investors more cautious than in the 2000s.
Local Unskilled Workers
Many permanent unskilled workers and day labourers are recruited on the
local market. For unskilled workers, employers often use their staffs’ per-
sonal networks, while day labourers are usually taken on at the entrances to
the plants or the mining concessions. In both cases, the selection of workers
is generally left to the recruiting agent’s discretion, but some mining com-
panies that are established in rural areas have made the commitment to give
preference to the ‘local community’ within the framework of their corporate
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social responsibility (CSR) programme. The companies’ social departments
ask customary chiefs to propose a number of candidates. In the case of Tenke
Fungurume Mining (TFM), which will be studied in more detail below, a
database listing the name, skills and contact details of local residents was
created before the start of the project. Until recently, low-skilled workers
were selected from this database by public draw.
Permanent unskilled workers and day labourers receive a salary of be-
tween US$ 100 and US$ 200 per month. In addition to this salary, perma-
nent unskilled workers are legally entitled to various employment benefits,
including transport to the mining site, holidays and access to healthcare for
them and their family. Whereas in Chinese companies, legal benefits are
not systematically awarded to workers, in Western companies, they are fre-
quently supplemented by sacks of maize flour, school allowances and/or a
year-end bonus. Nevertheless, unskilled workers consider their remunera-
tion to be insufficient to support their families. Most of them have to rely on
credit and informal activities (such as driving a taxi or farming) in parallel
with their job in order to make ends meet.
Unskilled workers also have more stable jobs than day labourers, who can
be fired overnight without justification. Under Congolese labour law, day
labourers cannot be hired for more than 22 days over a two-month period.
In artisanal mining companies, however, this limit is often exceeded. The
former HR manager of an Indian mining project told me that the company
employed between 250 and 800 labourers — mainly artisanal miners and
handlers — on site for five years, before subcontracting the employment of
this temporary workforce to a subsidiary company.12 Housed in makeshift
tents, these labourers earned about US$ 5 per day and had to buy their own
food. Every Sunday, a truck took them to the nearest market for this purpose.
Generally speaking, there are significant variations in the employment of
day labourers and unskilled workers between artisanal and industrial mining
companies, and between Asian and Western companies. As in the Indian
project mentioned above, enterprises involved in artisanal mining hire a
large number of day labourers as miners and/or handlers. In industrial min-
ing projects, the number of day labourers is important in the construction
phase, but falls sharply once production starts. With respect to permanent
jobs, in contrast to Western companies, Asian companies involved in both
artisanal and industrial mining tend to give preference to unskilled or low-
skilled workers, and to put them under the control of expatriate supervisors.
This results in workers who are actually qualified for the role of supervi-
sor, keeping their qualifications secret in the hope of being recruited. As
explained above, however, tasks (such as catering, cleaning, bush clearing,
etc.) that are performed by unskilled or low-skilled workers have increas-
ingly been outsourced to subcontractors in all of the mining companies.
12. Interview, former HR manager, Fungurume, 11 April 2017.
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Today, whatever their size or national origins, mining companies directly
employ only a limited number of unskilled workers and day labourers.
Overall, this analysis of mining companies’ hiring practices shows that
such methods result in an ‘ethnotechnical hierarchy’ (Hecht, 2002: 699; see
also Welker, 2014: 81), that correlates benefits of the job (such as stabil-
ity, remuneration, working conditions, hierarchical position) with several of
the workers’ social characteristics, particularly their language skills, level
of education, place of residence and participation in various social net-
works. These hiring practices demonstrate different landscapes of labour
for unskilled workers, national skilled workers and expatriates, and show
how these three segments are respectively embedded in local communities,
major Congolese cities and the countries where foreign investors are es-
tablished. From a theoretical perspective, this three-tiered geography of the
labour market cannot be simply understood as resulting from the uneven
distribution of linguistic, educational and social capital in space; it is also
actively created by the people involved in the recruitment process and the
social networks that they activate (Hanson and Pratt, 1992). As a result, the
labour market has been rapidly caught in the factional struggles that make
up Congolese political life at every level — what is commonly referred to
as ‘geopolitics’ in the DRC.
CONFLICTS
A common characteristic of the different segments of the mining sector
labour market is the marginalization of women. Although Western compa-
nies give women a central place in their communication strategy, they only
employ about 4 per cent of women, principally in non-core departments
(such as medical, social and HR). This percentage is likely to be even lower
in Chinese companies, artisanal smelters and plants, or subcontracting com-
panies, except in catering and cleaning. In artisanal mining, while there are
many women sorting and washing heterogenite ore, they are excluded from
mining sites, strictly speaking. So, in general, women are under-represented
in themining sector, and the fewwho are employed tend to occupy secondary
positions. As Francesca Pugliese’s doctoral research13 shows, however, this
marginalization does not seem to be a source of conflict in the Congolese
copperbelt, where the mining industry has historically been constituted as a
male preserve.
The same cannot be said for the inequalities between the different seg-
ments of the labour market identified above. These inequalities arouse strong
feelings of injustice and dispossession, and give rise to more or less open
13. Pers. comm. Francesca Pugliese is working on her PhD thesis on mine workers in the
Congolese copperbelt within the framework of the WORKinMINING project. Her main
focus is on the experience of women working for foreign mining companies.
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conflicts. This will be illustrated below using the case of TFM, the most
important mining project so far. Often cited as a model project due to its em-
ployment and community development policies, it has created particularly
strong expectations in the Congolese population. During my stay in the TFM
mining project in 2012, there were only 62 expatriates in a total workforce
of 2,900. The use of words like ‘White’ or ‘Black’ was strictly forbidden,
and some American workers made efforts to socialize with their Congolese
colleagues and subordinates. In contrast to other Western companies, few
complaints were filed with the HR department for racially discriminatory
discourse or behaviour. However, it did not take long for Congolese man-
agers to notice that many of the key positions were in the hands of expatriate
(mostly American) executives, who were housed in a separate camp. The
few Congolese in a position of responsibility were supervised by an expatri-
ate, who monopolized relations with superiors (on the consequences of this
practice on work relations, see Burawoy, 1972, 2014). One Congolese man-
ager was particularly critical about the tendency of the Americans to ‘behave
like chiefs’ — that is, to make decisions in a discretionary and authoritarian
manner, without consulting Congolese colleagues—and to consider English
language proficiency ‘a sign of intelligence’. For him, the way expatriate
executives assess Congolese colleagues is only partially based on their work.
As he explained, he gets up early and works hard, but he will never have
access to the expatriates’ positions and remuneration.14
The privileges of expatriates may have resulted in individual frictions at
work, but not in collective claims and conflicts as was the case with access
to permanent jobs. Since the contract for the mining project was signed in
2005, the populations of neighbouring towns Tenke and Fungurume have
tripled. Most immigrants, I was told, came with the hope of finding a job,
even though a large number of them ended up working as artisanal miners.
To stem the influx of these migrants and develop good relations with the
‘local community’, the company created a database listing the residents
in the concession at the beginning of the project and set up a recruiting
procedure giving priority to them. For low-skilled jobs, candidates were to
be selected from the database by public draw. Skilled jobs were open to
all, but in the case of equal test results, candidates included in the database
were to be given preference. On several occasions, the company also asked
customary chiefs to send lists of candidates. Early on, however, voices were
raised denouncing the recruitment of ‘foreigners’, demanding a say in the
selection process, and calling for the establishment of quotas in favour of
‘residents’, ‘autochthons’, or the ‘children of chiefs’.
These terms clearly reflect the different meanings that have been attributed
to the concept of ‘local community’ that is promoted by TFM. For chiefs, it
refers to the community of their subjects, that is, Sanga people living inside
14. Interviews, TFM manager, Fungurume and Lubumbashi, 9 and 11 July 2012, and 6 August
2016.
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the concession. For the cultural association Lwanzo Lwa Mikuba — which
represents the interests of Sanga speakers — it refers to all the members of
Sanga-speaking tribes (Sanga, Yeke, etc.), whatever their place of residence.
For Forces Vives, a platform representing the interests of various cultural
associations in Katanga, it refers to people from Katanga Province resid-
ing in the concession, regardless of their tribe. These different meanings
echo the flexibility of discourses about autochthony in DRC and elsewhere
(Geschiere, 2009; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 2000; Hilgers, 2011; Jackson,
2006).
The company’s social department reports on the situation in the local com-
munity and frequently notes the widespread discontent about the marginal-
ization of ‘local’ people on the labour market. Among these dissenting
voices, that of Lwanzo Lwa Mikuba has been the loudest. Its representa-
tives have regularly sent letters, requested meetings and organized marches
to denounce the grip of the Lunda people on the recruitment process, to
demand the departure of some Lunda managers, and to recommend Sanga-
speaking workers.15 In a letter from 2012, written under the title ‘Operation
Half-and-Half’, they even put forward a detailed plan that aimed to raise the
proportion of ‘autochthons’ to 50 per cent of the company’s workforce: it
consisted of expelling foreigners from the company and replacing them with
Sanga-speaking people. Until now, TFM has challenged Lwanzo’s figures,
and has refused to meet its demands. In addition, with the development of the
project, it has recruited fewer unskilled workers from the database, which
has become increasingly obsolete. As a result, the ‘dialogue’ between the
company and the cultural association has gradually deteriorated.
Finally, TFM witnessed an influx of artisanal miners to its concession.
According to existing estimates, artisanal miners number between 3,000 and
10,000 in the area. They enter the concession during the night, with the
complicity of the industrial guards and members of the mining police, and
dig pits and tunnels in the hills. Each month hundreds of tons of heterogenite
leave the concession in this way. However, security services sometimes
arrest miners, seize their production, and hand them over for justice, which
has caused violent confrontations on several occasions. In 2010, for example,
a police team was dispatched to clear out artisanal miners from a hill: some
15. Interviews with various Lwanzo representatives, Lubumbashi, Fungurume and Kolwezi, 1
August 2016, 12 April 2017 and 31 October 2017. Their demands must be understood in the
broader context of the fragmentation and decentralization of the Congolese provinces that
took effect in 2015 (see Englebert et al., 2018; Gobbers, 2016). Within the framework of
this reform, the district of Kolwezi, where the most important mining projects are located,
has been integrated into the province of Lualaba. According to Lwanzo representatives,
this decision benefited the Lunda and other related tribes at the expense of the Sanga:
Lunda leaders found themselves in a position to monopolize positions of power in the new
provincial government, and to lay hands on the mining rent. From 2009 onwards, Lwanzo
organized several protest actions against this decision, for which its national president was
jailed for two years.
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miners were arrested and several trucks loaded with ore were seized. The
following day, hundreds of miners walked to the TFMoffices to claim access
to the hill, a demand which was refused. In response, they looted and burnt
several company trucks. In 2014, a similar incident occurred: an artisanal
miner was killed during an altercation with the police and his fellow miners
vandalized one of TFM’s community liaison offices in retaliation.
As these news stories suggest, TFM’s relationship with artisanal miners
is more violent than that with Lwanzo. The main reason for this difference
in treatment is that miners claim access to the ore, not to employment, and
their opponents are not Congolese managers within the company, but the
company itself. TFM regards artisanal miners as criminals who enter its
property illegally, and so treats them as such. In turn, artisanal miners, who
have nothing to lose, claim their rights to the land of their ancestors, and
argue that the local economy benefits more from their activities than from
the presence of TFM.
CONCLUSION
The mining strategy of the World Bank has given rise to conflicting assess-
ments of the potential contribution of foreign mining investments in Africa.
Although important, this debate often leads to a depiction of African soci-
eties as being either the beneficiaries or the victims of new mining projects.
At best, the consequences of the World Bank strategy are understood to re-
sult in a simple division between winners and losers. Focusing on the labour
market in the Congolese copper mining sector, this article suggests that the
mining boom has generated a more complex structure of inequalities.
Following the liberalization of themining sector in the late 1990s and early
2000s, a large labour market was created as a result of the development of
both industrial and artisanal mining, and the addition of dozens of new
companies. This new market came to be segmented along three intersecting
lines of division: the first corresponds to the distinction between industrial
and artisanal mining companies; the second to the cleavage between direct
jobs in mining companies and indirect jobs in subcontracting firms; and the
third to the use of different channels for recruiting expatriate executives and
supervisors, national managers and skilled workers, and local low-skilled
or unskilled workers. All these lines of structuration affect the quality of
employment: each creates significant variations in terms of job stability,
levels of compensation and working conditions. As a result, the labour
market cannot be studied along one of these lines of division alone. Indirect
jobs in subcontracting companies, for example, are not necessarily worse
than direct jobs in mining companies. It depends on the type of company
and the category of workers involved.
Particular attention has been paid to the third line of segmentation, and
its embeddedness in space. The division of the labour market into three
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segments (for expatriates,managers and skilledworkers, and unskilledwork-
ers) is often justified by the varying skills of these different categories of
workers and the employment costs that are associated with them. From this
viewpoint, their anchorage in different spaces (international, national and lo-
cal) would simply reflect the uneven distribution of skills (and labour costs)
in rural areas, large cities, and the expatriates’ countries of origin. A more
detailed analysis, however, shows that these inequalities are also due to the
mining companies’ use of separate recruitment channels, which mobilize
different social networks. The search for a job is above all based on social
networks, and for the three categories of workers involved, these networks
are embedded in relatively separate places.
In view of the inequalities between the different segments of the labour
market, it is hardly surprising that they cause resentment, friction and protest
actions. To defuse potential conflicts, and secure their investment, some
mining companies that take part in CSR initiatives have chosen to give
priority to the ‘local community’ in the recruitment of personnel. As the
case of TFM shows, this job localization strategy has not altered the three-
tiered segmentation of the labourmarket. However, it has given rise to claims
from various collective actors, who attempt to control access to the labour
market on the basis of autochthony, without much success. Their claims
highlight the flexible nature of autochthony as a discourse: according to the
speaker and the situation, it may refer to the chieftaincy, the locality, the
tribe, the people speaking a given language, the province or the country.
Whatever the size of the community that it calls upon, this discourse rests
on a common feeling of dispossession, that of seeing the benefits of mining
going to foreign entities, while the Congolese are left with the ‘holes’ — the
abandoned quarries that the investors will leave behind at the end of their
projects.
The labour market segmentation model that is sketched here could serve
as a basis from which to compare the dynamics of inequality that are en-
gendered by mining investments in other areas of the world, provided that
particular attention is paid to the varying weight of the three lines of labour
market segmentation mentioned above. The concomitant development of
industrial and artisanal mining is contingent on geology. The importance of
subcontracting depends on the degree to which production is mechanized,
and on the presence of service companies locally. As for the segmentation
of the labour market into separate recruitment channels, this varies with
the location of mining projects, but the works of Hecht (2002) and Welker
(2014) suggest that the ethnotechnical hierarchy found in DRC is not spe-
cific to this country, or to copper mining in general. In all circumstances,
these cleavages are likely to cause tensions, and to give rise to claims for
another form of wealth distribution on the basis of rights that are related to
the land. Such claims are part of a struggle to change the rules of the game,
but contrary to what Ferguson (2015) and Li (2017) seem to suggest, they
do not necessarily contribute to more social justice. When expressed in the
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discourse of autochthony, ethnicity or nationalism — as is often the case,
both in DRC and elsewhere — they are likely to result in other forms of
exclusion and inequality.
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